AUTHORITY · LIVING SPEC §7–8 · ABI §9.2
WHERE TRUTH COMES FROM
Four independently-derived views of the same system that must be identical — and a fidelity level a profile can never claim above, only voluntarily below.
How does VINDEX3 know a container is complete and faithful?
Four independently derived authorities must agree — what the source declared, what detection resolved, what the graph encodes, and what the container's bytes actually hold — with both ends re-hashed at verify time. Operand closure then proves the executable program is total: every stored tensor maps to an operation, every operation carries judged semantics, and a missing operand is a named refusal. Nothing is asserted; agreement is derived.
THE FOUR-AUTHORITY INVARIANT — G4
Declared ≡ Resolved ≡ Graph ≡ Encoded
Declared
what HF said
Resolved
what the reader interpreted
Graph
the logical system at G2
Encoded
what the container contains
layer_rope_theta[3] = 0
PositionPolicy::None
attention[3].position = none
attention[3].position = none
PASS
The spec's own worked example: a judged semantic, carried intact from source declaration to encoded container.
layer_rope_theta[3] = 0
rope(theta = 0)
attention[3].position = rope
attention[3].position = rope
FAIL
The named trap, rendered: NoPE ≠ rope(theta = 0). A resolver that guesses instead of judging breaks Declared ≡ Resolved — and the comparison catches it. (Values illustrative; the distinction is the spec's, load-bearing.)
Verification re-hashes both ends. Recomputed source, recomputed encoded, recorded — all three must agree. A drifted checkpoint therefore fails differently (source ≠ recorded) from a corrupted container (encoded ≠ recorded). And the tensor table is compared entry by entry, because a relabelled dtype or shape over identical bytes is invisible to every hash in the container.
Declared ≡ Resolved ≡ Graph ≡ Encoded — 1 of 2 rows agree; any disagreement is a distinct, named failure, never a warning.
Authority is derived, never asserted.
THE FOLD — THREE DEPTHS
SAYING SO, PRECISELY
A container is Canonical or Derived. A derived image cannot recompile itself — and saying so is the difference between an artifact that is missing something and one that never promised it. structurally-approximate is honest the same way: the omission is declared, listed, and folded into what the profile may claim.
THE FOLD — WORKED FOR A shared-only PROFILE
source-exact
Decoded values bit-identical to the source checkpoint, in the checkpoint's own encoding family.
source-equivalent
A different encoding whose decode reproduces the source values exactly.
numerically-approximate
Same architecture, lossy representation — Q6_K quantised from BF16.
structurally-approximate
Components omitted or replaced — must list omitted_components / replacement.
analysis-only
Incapable of complete forward execution — router and browse slices.
CAP 1
Weakest selected region fidelity: the selected Q6_K regions are lossy against their BF16 source.
source-exact ↓ numerically-approximate
CAP 2
Declared structural omission: the shared-only profile omits the routed expert banks.
numerically-approximate ↓ structurally-approximate
DERIVED
structurally-approximate
A profile cannot claim above its derived level; it may voluntarily claim below it. Kernel maturity affects speed and support status — never fidelity.
source-exact → capped by weakest selected region fidelity: the selected q6_k regions are lossy against their bf16 source. → numerically-approximate → capped by declared structural omission: the shared-only profile omits the routed expert banks. → structurally-approximate — derived, never asserted.
the ABI — §9.2 Authority — graded, derived, never asserted
Levels (mandatory, fail-closed):
| Level | Meaning |
source-exact | Decoded values bit-identical to the source checkpoint, in the checkpoint's own encoding family (e.g. native MXFP4 regions of a native-MXFP4 model) |
source-equivalent | Different encoding whose decode reproduces the source values exactly (e.g. a lossless Q6_K container of native MXFP4 values) |
numerically-approximate | Same architecture, lossy representation (e.g. Q6_K quantised from BF16) |
structurally-approximate | Components omitted or replaced (reduced top-K, shared-only layers, compiled subexperts) — must list omitted_components / replacement |
analysis-only | Incapable of complete forward execution (router/browse slices) |
Authority is derived, not declared: every variant carries a region-level fidelity set at extraction time from provenance, and a profile's authority is the weakest fidelity across its active selections, further capped by programme traversal (§11) when required operands are absent. This closes the loophole where a lossy extraction becomes "exact" merely by being named the baseline. A profile cannot claim above its derived level; it may voluntarily claim below it.
The container-level authority field (§5.2) grades the container itself: canonical for a source encode, derived for a container COMPILE produced from effective (possibly mutated or re-encoded) state — reported apart from per-representation fidelity, so a derived container never presents as the source of truth.
excerpt — trimmed at a word boundary the whole document →
What a profile may claim is folded down a graded lattice by caps — never declared. Read it, work it, or read the clause that governs it.
Authority — learn: what a claim is worth · inspect: the fold, worked · spec: the clause that governs it. One concept, one URL, the depth of your choosing.
AND YET — CONSISTENCY IS NOT SUFFICIENCY
Four honest witnesses can still tell an incomplete story: all four authorities can faithfully agree on an under-specified system. That is why agreement is only half the proof. The other half is closure — every stored tensor accounted for by an operation, every operation by judged semantics — and it lives in the execution chapter, where the two halves finally lock.
The fold
Fidelity pushed down the lattice, one judged cap at a time, until the level a profile may claim is derived — never asserted.
Agreement proves the story is consistent. Execution proves it is complete.
PUBLISHED 29 AUG 2026 · REVISED 30 AUG 2026 · VERSION 3.0 Candidate
CITEsite build 43a1b6b · built 2026-09-02
CITE THIS
Web page · 3.0 Candidate
Hay, C. (2026). Authority. In VINDEX3 Specification (Version 3.0 Candidate). VINDEX3. https://vindex3.org/authority
A chapter of the specification, citable on its own. Cite the version rather than the site — the canonical reference, and how to use it, live at /cite.
SOURCES
- vindex3-format.md §1.2, §7–8 (the living spec)
- vindex3-format-spec.md §9.2 (the 3.0 Candidate)
- reference implementation — capability/authority.rs